This paper analyses why traditional market models, such as perfect competition,monopolistic competition, oligopoly, and duopoly, are not suitableforthe dynamics of digital business platforms. While these models were developed for traditional physical goods and services markets, digital platforms introduce unique characteristics like network effects, low marginal costs, multi-homing, and data-driven competition that alter the competitive landscape. The study reveals that digital platforms often lead to winner-takes-all outcomes, lower barriers to entry, and rapid innovation, which challenges conventional economic theories. Additionally, the rise of multi-homing and the dynamic nature of digital markets make it difficult for firms to maintain stable monopolies or oligopolies. The research underscores the need for more nuanced models to understand platform competition and calls for the development of adaptive regulatory frameworks to address the complexities of digital business environments. These findings contribute to ongoing discussions on digital governance and the need for policy approaches that balance innovation with protecting competition and consumer rights.
